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JUDICIAL BACKGROUNDS AND CRIMINAL CASES
STUART S. NAGEL*

Various scholars of the judicial process have compiled data on differences in the backgrounds of
American judges, but they have not shown that
these background characteristics correlate with
differences in the decisions of the judges analyzed.'
Various other scholars of the judicial process have
compiled data on the different decisional tendencies of American judges, but they similarly have
not shown that these decisional propensities correlate with differences in the backgrounds of the
judiciary.2 It is the purpose of this paper to explore
the empirical relationships between various background and attitudinal characteristics of judges
and their decisions in criminal cases.3
4

THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The judges analyzed consist of the 313 state
and federal supreme court judges listed in the 1955
* Professor Nagel, a member of the Illinois bar, is
Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science of the University of Illinois.
The writer gratefully thanks the Political Theory
and Legal Philosophy Committee of the Social Science
Research Council for providing funds for conducting a
study of relations between judicial characteristics and
judicial decision-making of which study this paper is a
part. Thanks are also owed to the members of the 1960
SSRC Summer Research Institute on the Administration of Criminal Justice for the suggestions which they
made
relevant to the completion of this paper.
1
E.g., Schmidhauser, The Justices of the Supreme
Court: A Collective Portrait, 3 M.W.J. or PoL SCL 1
(1958); EwING, THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT

1789-1937 (1938); Mott, Judicial Personnel, 167 ANNALS 143 (1933).

2E.g., Gaudet, Individual Differences in Sentencing

Tendencies of Judges, 32 ARcmiEs oF PSYcHOLOGY 1

(1938); Iverson, Human Element in Justice, 10 J.
Cm. L. & C. 90 (1919); PITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT

COURT (1948); SCnUERr, QUANTITATIvE ANALYsIs Or
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959).

Non-statistical speculations on the relations between judicial characteristics and judicial decisions
include Haines, General Observations on the Effects of
Personal, Political, and Economic Influences on the
Decisions of Judges, 17 ILL. L. REv. 96 (1922); FRANx,
COURTS ON TRIAL 146-56, 165-85 (1950); CARR, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 231-57 (1942);

and Hall, Determinationof Methodsfor Ascertaining the
Factors that Influence Judicial Decisions in Cases Involving Due Processof Law, 20 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 127
(1926).
4 For a more detailed analysis and justification of the
judges, the cases, and the analysis used in the research
design than can be given here see Nagel, Testing Relations Between Judicial Characteristics and Judicial
Decision-Making (a mimeographed paper presented at
the 1961 Midwest Conference of Political Scientists).
Copies of this paper are available on request from the
writer.

Directory of American Judges;5 15 judges so listed

left the bench before the end of the year, however,
and as a result were included in only certain portions of the study.8 The background characteristics of the judges were determined by consulting
the Directory of American Judges, Who's Who in
America,7 the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory,8
and the governmental directories published by
many of the states. The attitudinal characteristics
of the judges were determined on the basis of their
answers to mailed questionnaires.
The cases analyzed consist of the full-court
criminal cases which these judges heard in 1955.
By full-court cases is meant cases heard by all
judges in the sample from the court involved. By
criminal cases is meant cases in which one party
was charged with an act subject to fine, imprisonment, or other penalty owed to the collectivity
rather than to the individuals who may have been
particularly harmed. The cases involved both appeals and habeas corpus proceedings, and they
centered around questions of guilt, punishment, or
procedure. Tax and business regulation cases were
excluded because they were analyzed separately
in the larger study of which this paper is a part.
Each judge was given a decision score representing the proportion of times he voted for the defense
out of all the times he voted in the criminal cases.
For example, in the 21 Pennsylvania criminal
cases, 9 Justice Arnold voted 3 times for the de-

'DIRECTORY or AMERICAN JUDGES (Liebman ed.
1955). This source is sometimes referred to herein as the
DIRECTORY.
6The term "supreme court" is used as a synonym
for "highest court" or "court of last resort." Statements
in this paper describing the background characteristics
of the judges are based on all 313 judges, except for
those who did not supply the relevant background information. Statements describing the relations between
backgrounds and decisional tendencies, however, are
based on 298 judges (313 minus the 15 judges who left
the bench before the end of the year), except for those
who did not supply the relevant background information, who sat only on unanimous cases, or who sat on
courts that were homogeneous as to the relevant background characteristics.
726, 27, 28 WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA (Sammons ed.
1954, 1956, 1958).
8 MARTINDALE-HUBBELL INC., MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW DIRECTORY (1955).
0 Commonwealth v. Burdell, 380 Pa. 43, 110 A.2d
193 (1955); Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52,
110 A.2d 216 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mackley, 380
Pa. 70, 110 A.2d 172 (1955); Commonwealth v. Grays,
380 Pa. 77, 110 A.2d 422 (1955); Commonwealth ex.
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fense, resulting in a decision score of .14. Sometimes
a judge did not vote clearly for either the prosecution or the defense, as where he concurred in part
and dissented in part. In one Pennsylvania case, 0
Justice Musmanno cast such a half-way vote, resulting in a decision score of 11 Y out of 21 or .55.
The data were analyzed to determine what judicial characteristics, if any, were associated with a
decision score above the average for a given court.
For example, the question was posed whether being
a Democrat rather than a Republican is associated
with a decision score above the average for one's
court. The answers to this and similar questions
for the data used are presented in the Table
which accompanies this paper.
The Table includes data for only those courts
on which both groups compared are present, because if, for example, there are all Democrats or all
Republicans on a court, then comparisons within
the court between judges from the two parties cannot be made. The Table also includes data for only
non-unanimous cases, because the unanimous
cases have no bearing on who is above or below the
average decision score of a court.
The probability scores listed in the far right
column represent the probability of the observed
differences occurring merely by chance, given the
number of judges involved in each group." Where
the scores are less than .05 (i.e., less than 5 out of
100), the differences have been regarded as statistically significant and not merely attributable to
chance, in accordance with conventional statistical procedures. In the discussion which follows,
each row will be discussed separately, and an illusrel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380 Pa. 152, 110 A.2d 240 (1955);
Commonwealth ex. rel. Lane v. Baldi, 380 Pa. 201, 110
A.2d 409 (1955); Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa.
532, 112 A.2d 379 (1955); Commonwealth v. LaRue,
381 Pa. 113, 112 A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Lane, 381 Pa. 293, 113 A.2d 290 (1955); Commonwealth v. Thompson, 381 Pa. 299, 113 A.2d 274 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa. 309, 112 A.2d 174
(1955); Commonwealth v. Cisneros 381 Pa. 447, 113
A.2d 293 (1955); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 381 Pa.
500, 113 A.2d 464 (1955); Commonwealth ex rd. Matthews v. Day, 381 Pa. 617, 114 A.2d 122 (1955); Commonwealth v. Farrow. 382 Pa. 61, 114 A.2d 170 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Capps, 382 Pa. 72, 114 A.2d 338
(1955); Commonwealth v. Wable, 382 Pa. 80, 114 A.2d
334 (1955); Commonwealth ex rt. Taylor v. Superintendent of the County Prison, 382 Pa. 181, 114 A.2d
343 (1955); Commonwealth ex rt. Bishop v. Maroney,
382 Pa. 324, 114 A.2d 906 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955); Commonwealth v. Moon, 383 Pa. 18, 117 A.2d 96 (1955).
10Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d
216 (1955).
" YUKxR, A GUIDE TO STATISTICAL CALCULATIONS
64-66 (1958); SIEGEL, NoN-PARAMeTRIC STATISTICS
FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 13-14 (1956).
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trative court will be described for each relationship
which falls below the .05 level of chance probability.
THE RESEARCH FINDINGS
PoliticalParty Affiliation

The first row of the Table tends to indicate that
on the bipartisan supreme courts Democratic and
Republican judges do differ from one another in
deciding criminal cases. In 1955, 15 bipartisan state
and federal supreme courts decided at least one
non-unanimous criminal case on which all their
judges sat. These courts were comprised of 85
judges who gave a party affiliation in the sources
consulted. Fifty-five per cent of the 40 Democrats
were above the average of their respective courts
on the decision score, whereas only 31 per cent
of the 45 Republicans were above the average of
their respective courts on the decision score.
The California Supreme Court illustrates this
statistically significafit difference. Two of the California judges, Justices Carter and Traynor, declared themselves as Democrats in the Directory,
and 2, Justices Shenk and Spence, declared themselves as Republicans. Justices Edmonds, Gibson,
and Schauer did not indicate party affiliation. It is
unusual for so many judges on a supreme court not
to give party affiliation. The California Supreme
Court, however, is not an elected court. Partly to
eliminate partisan influence, the judges are appointed initially by the governor with the approval
of a Commission on Qualifications, and they appear
on the ballot for voter approval every 12 years
thereafter. In 1955 only Missouri had a similar
system of judicial election. In spite of this attempt
to eliminate partisan divisions, Democrats Carter
and Traynor were on opposite sides of Republicans
Shenk and Spence in a large number of cases of
different types. All 7 judges of the court heard 14
criminal cases together in which non-unanimous
decisions were reached."2 The 2 Democrats had an
12 Lyons v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 2d 755, 278 P.2d
681 (1955); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279 P.2d 24
(1955); People v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 166, 280 P.2d 769
(1955); Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 178,
281 P.2d 250 (1955); In re Bartges, 44 Cal. 2d 241, 282
P.2d 47 (1955); People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d 252,
282 P.2d 53 (1955); People v. Terry, 44 Cal. 2d 371,
282 P.2d 19 (1955); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P.2d 905 (1955); People v. Berger, 44 Cal. 2d 459,
282 P.2d 509 (1955); People v. Jackson, 44 Cal. 2d
511, 282 P.2d 898 (1955); In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171,
288 P.2d 5 (1955); People v. Acosta, 45 Cal. 2d 538,
290 P.2d 1 (1955); People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d
590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955); Calhoun v. Superior Court,
46 Cal. 2d 18, 291 P.2d 474 (1955).
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TABLE
How JUDGES OF DIFFERING BACKGROUNDS AND ATTITUDES DIFFER IN TiHEIR CRIMINAL CASE DEcisIONs
Based on the non-unanimous cases of the state and federal supreme courts of 1955 on which both groups being
compared are present.

I
Group I (Hypothesized
Group 2 tltypothesized
to be less defense minded) i to be more defense minded)

'of

-

of

Number
of
Judges In-

Group
Above I

volved in
Each Group

Their
Court
Average
on the
) [ iston

Their
Court
Average
on the
Deciio

Score*

Score*

Group 2
Above

e
die

-

Probability of the
Psitiveueifference
B eing D~ue to Chance

PARTY

Republicans
PRESSURE GROUPS
Members of a busihess group
Members of ABA
Members of a nativist group
OCCUPATIONS
Former businessmen
Former prosecutors
EDUCATION
Attended high tuition law school
AGE
Over age 65

Democrats

31C(C

Less than .05

Did not indicate such
membership
Did not indicate such
membership
Did not indicate such
membership

47

.20 to .50

37

Less than .05

36

.20 to .50

Did not indicate such
occupation
Did not indicate such
occupation

32

.05 to .20

36

Less than .05

Attended low tuition
law school

54

.20 to .50

Under age 60

43

Negligible tliff.

Practiced initially in
large city

35

Negligible diff.

Catholics
Low income Prot. denomination
Part non-British ancestry

31
41

High general liberalism
score
High criminal liberal-

27

+30 1 Less than .05

27

Less than .05

GEOGRAPHY

Practiced initially in
small town
RiLGION AND ANCESNATION-.
TRAL
ALITY

Protestants
High income Prot.
denomination
Only British Ancestry
ATTITUDES
Low general liberalism score
Low criminal liberal-

ism score

38

+25
+9

Less than .05
.05 to .20

+9 1 .05 to .20

ism score

* Decision Score: proportion of times voting for the defense in criminal cases.

average decision score in these cases of 85 per cent
for the defense, whereas the 2 Republicans had an
average decision score in the same cases of only 18
per cent for the defense. In the famous Chessman
case of 1955, for example, the only 2 dissenters in
favor of the defense were Democrats Carter and
Traynor.
Other supreme courts in which the Democrats

had a higher average decision score for the defense
than did the Republicans include the supreme
courts of Colorado, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, North
Dakota, and Pennsylvania. Of the 15 courts with
qualifying criminal cases, only the Illinois, New
York, Ohio, Utah, and federal supreme courts
followed an opposite pattern, although not to as
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great extent as the 10 courts which followed the
general pattern.

legislator, corporation counsel, businessman,
teacher, public administrator, attorney general,
and regulatory agency attorney. The pre-judicial
PressureGroup Affiliations
occupations thought to have the most relevance to
Many of the judges were members of pressure decisional differences among judges in criminal
groups which endorse various kinds of legislation. cases were those of businessman and prosecuting
The types of pressure groups most frequently men- attorney. Although judges who were former busitioned were professional groups (e.g, the American
nessmen tended to have a lower decision score for
Bar Association), veterans' groups (e.g., the the defense in criminal cases than did judges who
American Legion), business groups (e.g., chambers were not, the difference was not quite statistically
of commerce), and nativist groups (e.g., the Sons significant. However, 50 per cent of the judges
of the American Revolution). Decision scores of who did not indicate being former prosecutors had
the judges who were members of these groups did decision scores above the average for their respecnot differ to a statistically significant extent from tive courts, whereas only 36 per cent of the judges
the decision scores of the non-member judges, with who did indicate being former prosecutors had
the exception of the scores pertaining to member- such scores.
ship in the American Bar Association. The Table
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court exemplifies
shows that 52 per cent of the judges who indicated the general pattern found on supreme courts having
(in the Directory, Who's Who, or Martindale-Hub- some judges who were former prosecutors. On this
bell) that they were not members of the A.B.A. had
court, 3 of the judges (Justices Arnold, Bell, and
decision scores above the average for their respec- Chidsey) indicated tLey had been prosecutors betive courts, whereas only 37 per cent of the judges fore becoming judges. In the 9 nonunanimous
who indicated that they were members of the criminal cases which the full court heard in 1955,
ABA had such scores.
the other 4 judges in the court (Justices Jones,
On the United States Supreme Court, for in- Musmanno, Stearne, and Stern) had an average
stance, Justices Black, Douglas, Frankfurter, and decision score of 26 per cent for the defense,
Minton did not indicate ABA membership, while whereas the 3 judges who were former prosecutors
Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Burton, had an average decision score for the defense of only
Clark, Harlan, and Reed, did indicate such mem- 7 per cent 4 Mr. Justice Musmanno, the famous
bership. In the 9 full-court non-unanimous crimi- defense lawyer in the Sacco-Vanzetti case and
nal cases of 1955, the 4 non-ABA members had other criminal cases, alone had a decision score of
an average decision score of 70 per cent for the de- 94 per cent for the defense in these cases.
fense, whereas the 5 ABA members had only an
average decision source of 51 per cent. 3 Subsequent Education, Age, and Geography
to 1955 the Chief Justice withdrew from the ABA
Approximately one-third of the 313 supreme
on ideological grounds. If Warren were considered
court judges serving in 1955 went to law schools
a non-ABA member in 1955, then the average whose annual tuition was under $120 in 1927 (the
decision score of the non-ABA group would move earliest year for which school-by-school tuition
up to 71 per cent for the defense, and the average figures are available), and approximately onedecision score of the ABA group would move third went to law schools whose annual tuition
down to 45 per cent for the defense.
was over $240.1' A higher percentage of judges who
Pre-JudicialOccupations
Many of the judges indicated that they had
formerly held occupations other than the private
practice of law. The types of occupations most frequently mentioned were prosecuting attorney,
"3Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955); In the
Matter of Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955); Quinn v.
United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955); Emspak v. United
States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); Bart v. United States, 349
U.S. 219 (1955); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375
(1955); Donaducy v. Pennsylvania, 349 U.S. 913
(1955); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11 (1955); Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91 (1955).

1 Commonwealth v. Edwards, 380 Pa. 52, 110 A.2d
216 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel. Dunn v. Ruch, 380
Pa. 152, 110 A.2d 240 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel.
Lane v. Baldi, 380 Pa. 201, 110 A.2d 409 (1955);
Commonwealth v. Chaitt, 380 Pa. 532, 112 A.2d 379
(1955); Commonwealth v. LaRue, 381 Pa. 113, 112
A.2d 362 (1955); Commonwealth v. Mason, 381 Pa.
309, 112 A.2d 174 (1955); Commonwealth v. Cisneros,
381 Pa. 447, 113 A.2d 293 (1955); Commonwealth ex rel.
Taylor v. Superintendent of the County Prison, 382
Pa. 181, 114 A.2d 343 (1955); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 382 Pa. 639, 117 A.2d 204 (1955).
1"Tuition figures for the last law school each judge
attended were taken from REED, REviEw OF LEGAL

EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA FOR
THlE YEAR 1928 (1929).
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went to low tuition law schools (under $120) had
decision scores above the average for their respective courts than did judges who went to high tuition law schools (over $240). This difference, however, was not statistically significant. Likewise
there was no statistically significant difference between judges in the bottom third age group (under
60) and judges in the top third age group (over 65).
There was also no statistically significant difference between judges who practiced law initially in
small towns with populations under 5,000 (the
bottom third among the judges) and judges who
practiced initially in large cities with populations
over 100,000 (the top third among the judges). 6
Because in this study comparisons are made only
within courts, comparisons are not made between
judges of different regions. If &outhern supreme
courts were compared with northern supreme
courts, however, one might hypothesize that the
southern courts would have a higher per cent of
judgments granted to the defense than would the
northern courts because (1) violence is possibly
more condoned in the south than in the north, except violence by a Negro against a white, (2) less
efficient southern police are possibly more likely
to bring innocent persons to trial than are northern
police, and (3) southern lower courts are possibly
more likely to commit reversible error than are
northern lower courts.

Justices Oliphant, Vanderbilt, and Wachenfeld
indicated they were Protestants; and Justices
Burling and Jacobs gave no religious affiliation. In
the 12 non-unanimous criminal cases which the
full New Jersey Supreme Court heard in 1955, the
2 Catholics had an average decision score for the
defense of 52 per cent, whereas the 3 Protestants
had an average decision score for the defense of
only 28 per cent.17
The members of certain Protestant denominations are traditionally thought to have a higher
average income than that of members of other
Protestant denominations. The relatively high
income denominations are the Congregationalist,
Episcopalian, Presbyterian, and Unitarian; and
the relatively low income denominations are the
Baptist, Lutheran, and Methodist. 8 When judges
from each of the two groups sitting on the same
supreme court criminal cases were compared, the
judges from the relatively low income denominations tended to have i higher decision score for the
defense than did the judges from the relatively
high income denominations. The difference, however, was not quite statistically significant.
The ancestral nationality of each judge can be
roughly determined by taking each judge's paternal and maternal family names or their component parts to Elsdon C. Smith's Dictionary of
Family Names (1956), which in dictionary form
Religion and Ancestral Nationality
gives the nationality origin of over 10,000 family
Most of the judges with entries in the Directory names. If one compares judges whose ancestral
of American Judges listed their religion in response nationality is exclusively British (which includes
to the Directory questionnaire. There were too few English, Scotch, or Welsh) with judges on the
Jewish supreme court judges to make comparisons same court whose ancestral nationality is at least
between Jewish and non-Jewish judges. There were partly non-British (to the extent determinable in
11 supreme courts, however, which had some Cath- the Smith book), one finds that the judges of parolic and some Protestant judges, and which heard tially non-British derivation tend to have higher
some non-unanimous criminal cases with all judges decision scores for the defense than do the judges
present. These 11 supreme courts had 57 judges of wholly British derivation on the same courts.
who indicated they were either Catholics or Protes- This difference, however, is not quite statistically
tants. 56 per cent of the 18 Catholic judges had significant.
decision scores above the average for their respec17State v. Schmelz, 17 N.J.
A.2d SO (1955);
tive courts, whereas only 31 per cent of the 39 State v. Newton, 17 N.J. 271,227,11111 A.2d
272 (1955);
Protestants had such scores.
State v. Low, 18 N.J. 179, 113 A.2d 169 (1955); State
This statistically significant difference is illus- v. Cianoi, 18 N.J. 191, 13 A.2d 176 (1955); Johnson v.
State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955);
the Matter of
trated by the New Jersey Supreme Court. Justices White, 18 N.J. 449, 114 A.2d 261 In
(1955); State v.
Brennan and Heher indicated they were Catholics; Haines, 18 N.J. 550, 115 A.2d 24 (1955); State v. Wise,
19 N.J. 59, 115 A.2d 62 (1955); State v. Fary, 19 N.J.
1c Population figures for the place of initial law prac431, 117 A.2d 499 (1955); State v. D'Ippolita, 19 N.J.
tice of each judge were taken from 1 U.S. BmEAu 540, 117 A.2d 592 (1955); State v. DeMeo, 20 N.J. 1,
oF THE CENsUs, DFP'T oF CoNeRcE, CENSUS oF 118 A.2d 1 (1955); State v. Kociolek, 20 N.J. 92, 118
POPULATION 178-320 (1920). The year 1920 was the A.2d 812 (1955).
census year nearest to the year when the average judge
18Allinsmith, Religious Affiliation and Politico-Ecoamong the 313 judges began practicing law.
nomic Attitudes, 12 PUBLIC OPINION Q. 377 (1948).

COMMENTS AND RESEARCH REPORTS

Off-the-Bench Attitudes
In the spring of 1960 a mailed questionnaire was
sent to each of the 313 state and federal supreme
court judges of 1955 in order to determine their
attitudes on various issues. One hundred and nineteen of the judges returned answered questionnaires. The questiqnnaire represented a condensed
and revised version of a liberalism-conservatism
questionnaire written by H. J. Eysenck. 19 The
judges were asked to indicate whether on the
whole they agreed a lot, agreed a little, neither
agreed nor disagreed, disagreed a little, or disagreed a lot with a list of statements. The questionnaire was primarily designed to measure the
degree of sympathy a respondent has for less
privileged groups and the degree of acceptance he
has toward long run social change. These two components make up what is generally referred to as
liberalism. 20 The questionnaire was scored in such
a way that a respondent could receive a liberalism
score ranging from 41 to 195. The median liberalism score actually received was 109. Seventeen
supreme courts that heard full-court non-unanimous criminal cases had at least one judge with a
score over 109 and at least one judge with a score
at or below 109. Fifty-seven per cent of the judges
scoring above 109 were above the average of the
respondents of their respective courts on the decision score, whereas only 27 per cent of the judges
scoring at or below 109 were above the average of
the respondents of their respective courts on the
decision score. This difference is statistically significant, but a specific example cannot be given
because the judges were promised anonymity if
they responded to the questionnaire.
There was one particularly relevant statement
to which the judges were asked to respond by indicating whether and how much they agreed or disagreed. This statement read "Our treatment of
criminals is too harsh; we should try to cure not to
punish them." Twenty-four of the 119 responding
judges indicated they strongly disagreed on the
whole with the statement, 48 disagreed but not
strongly, 22 neither disagreed nor agreed, 20 agreed
on the whole but not strongly, and 5 agreed
strongly. The average responding judge was thus
in between disagreeing mildly and being neutral.
Fifty-nine per cent of those who were neutral or
who agreed with the statement were above the
19EYsENc, PSYCHOLOGY OF POLrTICS 122-24 (1954).
2 MACIVER,

(1951).
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average of the respondents of their respective
courts on the decision score, whereas only 27 per
cent of those who disagreed with the statement
were above the average of the respondents of their
respective courts on the decision score. This difference is statistically significant.
REASONS AND REMEDIES

How might one account for the relationships between judicial characteristics and judicial decisionmaking that have been described? Some of the
relationships found are easily attributable to
chance. Others, however, are not. The latter are
those where the odds are more than 95 to 5, or 19
to 1, of obtaining the differences purely by chance
given the size of the differences and the size of
the groups. They include the differences between
Democratic arid Republican judges, non-ABA
members and ABA members, non-former prosecutors and former prosecutors, Catholic :udges
and Protestant judges, and relatively liberal judges
and relatively conservative judges as measured by
their off-the-bench attitudes.
To some extent a criminal case represents a conflict of social groups, in that the defendant generally tends to be a member of the lower-middle or
working class (particularly if tax and business
regulation cases are analyzed separately),21 and
the prosecutor tends to be a member of the uppermiddle or upper class, enforcing laws promulgated
by upper-middle and upper class legislators and
judges.n Mass data show that persons holding
certain positions (e.g., being a Democrat or a
Catholic) with respect to background characteristics (e.g., party or religion) tend to have greater
sympathy for lower economic and social groups
than do persons holding obverse positions.2 Given
the nature of the average criminal case, judges
holding such positions with respect to background
characteristics are therefore likely to have a higher
decision score for the defense than do judges holding obverse background positions. The correlation
between a judge's position on background characteristics and his relative degree of sympathy for
lower economic and social groups may account for
the differences found concerning party, pressure
groups, religion, and liberal-conservative attitudes.
21 TAFT, CRIMINOLOGY 131-33 (1950).
22
MATTHEwS, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF POLITI-

CAL DECISION-MAKERS 23-30 (1954).
2 CAMPBELL, GURIN & MILLER, TlE VOTER DEcrEs (1954); TURNER, PARTY AND CONSTITUENCY:
PRESSURES ON CONGRESS (1951).
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However, it probably does not account for the
differences found between former prosecutors and
their opposite number; judges who are former
prosecutors are probably on the average not substantially more or less ideologically liberal than
judges who have not been prosecutors. Their
lower decision scores for the defense are possibly
more attributable to a relatively pro-prosecution
frame of reference which caused them to become
prosecutors or which they acquired or had reinforced when they served as prosecutors.
Many devices are available for minimizing the
influence of judicial backgrounds, including the

availability to defendants of easy appeals, the requirement that judges write opinions to justify
their decisions, the use of multi-judge courts with
judges of diversified backgrounds, and the drafting
of clearer and more detailed substantive statutes
thereby limiting the area of judicial discretion.
Because criminal cases frequently involve valueoriented controversies, however, and because different background and attitudinal positioPs tend to
correspond to different value orientations, there
will probably always be some correlation between
judicial characteristics and judicial decision-making in criminal cases.

